Tag Archives: catastrophe bond

Unpacking Basis Risk

When catastrophe strikes, it is not unusual for the insurance payout to differ from the policyholder’s expectation. The possibility of such a discrepancy is referred to as “basis risk”. The term, however, can be ill-defined and easily misunderstood.

Therein lies the problem, without definition it is easy for the basis risk associated with a structure to remain unidentified and unquantified. If left unspoken, basis risk can lead to problems down the line, when events do occur. So, as a starting point, we can most simply define basis risk as the “difference between expectation and outcome”.

Continue reading

The Hurricane Hunter and the Cat Bond

The second Mexico multi-cat securitization was launched at the end of 2012 to provide reinsurance for the Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN) – established by the Mexican federal government as a disaster fund for the poor, which also finances disaster-damaged infrastructure. This three-year bond had a series of tranches covering earthquake or hurricane, each to be triggered by parametric “cat-in-a-box” structures. For one hurricane tranche, this was based on the central pressure of a storm passing into a large “box” drawn around the Pacific coasts of Mexico and Baja California, with the length of the box spanning well over a thousand miles. With a “U.S. National Hurricane Center (NHC) ratified” hurricane central pressure in the box of 920 millibars (mb) or lower there would be a 100 percent payout or $100 million; for a central pressure of 932 mb to 920 mb a 50 percent payout of $50 million.

Continue reading

Clearing the path for catastrophe bond issuance

Cat bond efficiency has come a long way in the last decade. The premature grey hair and portly reflection that peers back at me in the mirror serves as a reminder of a time when even the simplest deals seemed to take months of work.  A whole thriving food delivery industry grew up in the City of London just to keep us fed and watered back when success was measured on capacity to work a 120-hour week, as much as on quantitative ability.

Much has changed since then. Of course, complex ground-breaking deals still take a monumental amount of effort to place successfully—just ask anyone who’s been involved with Metrocat, PennUnion or Bosphorus, and they’ll tell you it’s a very intensive process.

But there’s little doubt that deal issuance has streamlined remarkably. It is now feasible to get a simple deal done in a matter of a few short weeks, and the market knows what to expect in the way of portfolio disclosure and risk analysis information. Indeed, collateralized reinsurance trades have pushed things further, removing some of the more complex structural obstacles to get risk into insurance linked securities (ILS) portfolios efficiently.

This week, I was on a panel at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Insurance and Risk Linked Securities Conference, discussing the ways in which the efficiency of the cat bond risk analysis could be further streamlined. This topic comes up a lot—a risk analysis can be one of the largest costs associated with a transaction (behind the structuring fees!), and certainly a major component of the time and effort involved.

If there’s one aspect we can all agree on, I suspect it’s the importance of understanding the risk in a deal, and how that deal might behave in different catastrophic scenarios. Commoditizing the risk analysis into a cookie-cutter view of a few well-known metrics is not the way to go—every portfolio is unique, and requires detailed, bespoke understanding if you’re to include it in a well performing ILS portfolio.

Going further, it is often suggested that the risk analysis could be removed from cat bonds—indeed, there’s no other asset class out there where the deal documents themselves contain an expertized risk analysis. Investors are increasingly sophisticated—many can now consume reinsurance submissions and have the infrastructure to analyze these in-house. The argument goes, why not let the investors do the risk analysis, and take it out of the deal—that way the deal can be issued more efficiently. One deal—Compass re II—has tested this hypothesis via the Rewire platform, and successfully placed with a tight spread.

Compass was parametric—this meant that disclosure was complete. The index was fully described, so investors (or their chosen modeling consultancy) could easily generate a view of risk for the deal.  This would not have been so straightforward for an indemnity deal—here, as an investor, you’d probably want to know the detailed contents of the portfolio in order to run catastrophe models appropriately. Aggregates won’t cut it if you don’t have a risk analysis.  So, for this to work with indemnity deals, disclosure would have to increase significantly.

An indemnity deal with no risk analysis would also open up the question of interpretation—even if all the detailed data were to be shared, how should the inuring reinsurance structures be interpreted?

This can be one of the most time consuming elements of even the simplest indemnity deals.  Passing this task on to the market rather than providing the risk analysis in the deal would inevitably lead to a change in the dynamic of deal marketing—suddenly investors would be competing more and more on the speed of their internal quoting process, and be required to develop large modeling infrastructure, far larger than most ILS funds currently have access to today.  Inevitably this would take longer and lead to a more uncertain marketing process.  Inevitably it must load cost into the system, which might well be passed back to issuers by way of spread or to end investors by way of management fees. Or both. Suddenly the cost saving in the bond structure doesn’t look as attractive.

I believe there’s a better alternative—and it’s already starting to happen. Increasingly, we are being engaged by potential deal sponsors much earlier in their planning process, often before they’ve even contemplated potential cat bond structures in detail. In this paradigm, the risk analysis can be largely done and dusted before the bond issuance process begins—of course, it’s fine-tuned throughout the discussions relating to bond structures, layers and triggers etc. But the bulk of the work is done, and the deal can happen efficiently, knowing precisely how the underlying risk will look as the deal comes together. This leads to much more effective bond execution, but doesn’t open up the many challenges associated with risk analysis removal.

Detailed understanding of risk, delivered in the bond documentation, but with analysis performed ahead of the deal timeline. Perhaps the catastrophe bond analysts of the future won’t have to suffer the ignominy of receiving Grecian 2000 for their 30th birthdays.

Ben and the RMS capital markets team will be talking more about innovation in the ILS market at Exceedance 2016– sign up today to join us in Miami

Cat Bond Pricing: Calculating the True Rewards

Commentary in the specialist insurance press has generally deemed pricing of catastrophe bonds in 2015 to have bottomed out. While true in average terms, baseline pricing figures mask risk-return values. True risk pricing can be calculated only by considering all dimensions of loss, including seasonal variations and the time value of money. New analysis by RMS does just that, and shows that cat bond pricing has actually been higher in 2015 than it was last year.

Pricing of individual cat bonds is based largely on the expected loss—the average amount of principal an investor can expect to lose in the year ahead. Risk modelers calculate the expected loss for each deal as part of the transaction structuring, but to obtain a market-wide view based on consistent assumptions, we first applied the same model across all transactions to calculate the average expected loss.

Care must be taken as all loss is not equal, a fact reflected in the secondary-market pricing of catastrophe bonds. Because of the time value of money, a loss six months from now is preferable to a loss today: you can invest the money you are yet to lose, and collect coupons in the meantime. We have calculated the time-valued expected loss across more than 130 issuances in the secondary markets, which we have called Cat Cost. It is dramatically different than unadjusted values, as shown in Figure 1.

The next step to reveal the true level of cat bond pricing involves accounting for secondary market pricing quotes. Figure 2 plots the same Cat Cost data as Figure 1, but now includes pricing quotes of the bonds, which we gleaned from Swiss Re’s weekly pricing sheets. Also plotted is the “Z-spread”—this is the spread earned if all future cash flows are paid in full and the metric is calculated using a proprietary cash flow model which determines future cash flows (floating and fixed), and discounts back to the current market price. The difference between the two—the space between the top and bottom lines—is the Cat-Adjusted Spread, which measures the expected catastrophe risk-adjusted return.

We can see clearly that on 30 September, 2014 the Cat Cost was 1.53%, identical to the Cat Cost on the same day in 2015. However, this year’s cat-adjusted spread for that day is 2.52%, compared to 2.22% for 2014. In other words, the pricing of cat bonds at the end of the third quarter of 2015 was thirty basis points higher than it was on the same date in in 2014, relative to the risk and adjusted for the time value of money.

The astute will have noticed that the bond spread rises each year as the hurricane season approaches, and falls as it wanes. To account for this seasonal pricing effect, and to reveal the underlying changes in market pricing, we have split the analysis between bonds covering U.S. hurricanes and those covering U.S. earthquakes.

The findings are plotted in Figure 3, and the picture is again dramatic. It is clear that the price of non-seasonal earthquake bonds is relatively static, while hurricane bond prices rise and fall based on the time of year.

      

This analysis further shows—for both hurricane and earthquake bonds—that spreads were higher this year than last, relative to adjusted risk. Steep drops in excess returns masked roughly static end-of-year returns in the cat bond market, rather than reflecting a risk-based price decline. Despite the prevailing commentary, the catastrophe bond market is returning markedly more to investors today than it did a year ago, when it bottomed out. But only accurate risk and return modeling reveals the true rewards.

This post is co-authored by Oliver Withers and Jinal Shah, CFA.

Jinal Shah

Director, Capital Markets, RMS
With more than 10 years of experience in the Insurance Linked Securities (ILS) market, Jin is responsible for managing investor relationships and new ILS product development at RMS. During his time at RMS, Jin has led analytical projects for catastrophe bond placements , and has designed new parametric indices to facilitate trading of index-based deals in peak zones, as well as introduced new pricing initiatives to the ILS market.

Jin currently focuses on pricing deals and managing portfolios with RMS ILS investor clients, and leads the development of Miu, the RMS ILS portfolio management platform. Jin holds a bachelor’s in Mathematics from The University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, and a master’s in Operational Research from Aston Business School and is a CFA charter holder.

Risk, Models, and Innovations: It’s All Interconnected

A few themes came through loud and clear during this morning’s keynote sessions at Exceedance 2015.

RMS’ commitment to modeling innovation was unmistakable. As RMS co-founder and CEO Hemant Shah highlighted on stage, RMS worked hard and met our commitment to release RiskLink version 15 on March 31, taking extra measures to ensure the quality of the product.

Over the past five years, RMS has released 210 model upgrades and 35 new models. With a 30% increase in model development resources over the last two years and 10 HD models in various stages of research and development, RMS has the most robust model pipeline in its history.

As Paul Wilson explained, HD models are all about providing better clarity into the risk. They are a more precise representation of the way a physical damage results in a (re)insurance loss, with a more precise treatment of propagation of uncertainty through the model, designed to deal with losses as closely as possible as the way claims occur in real life.

HD models are the cornerstone of the work RMS is doing in model development right now. HD models represent the intersection of RMS research, science and technology. With HD models we are not limited by software – we can approach the challenge of modeling risk in exciting new ways.

And it’s more than just the models – RMS is committed to transparency, engagement, and collaboration.

RMS’ commitment to RMS(one) was also clear. Learning from the lessons of the past year, RMS developing an open platform that’s not just about enabling RMS to build its own models. It’s an exposure and risk management platform that’s about enabling clients and partners to build models. It’s about analytics, dynamic risk management and more.

RMS(one) will be released, judiciously and fully-matured, in stages over the next 15 months,starting with a model evaluation environment for our first HD Model, Europe Flood, in autumn 2015.

And, Hemant emphasized that starting later this calendar year, RMS will open the platform to its clients and partners with the Platform Development Kit (PDK).

In addition, RMS(one) pricing will be built around three core principles:

  • Simple, predictable packages
  • In most cases, no additional fees for clients who simply want continuity in their RMS modeling relationships
  • Clearly differentiated high-value packages at compelling prices for those who wish to benefit from RMS(one) beyond its replacement as a superior modeling utility to RiskLink

The overall goal of RMS’ commitment to modeling and technology innovation is to capitalize on a growing and ever-changing global (re)insurance market, ultimately building a more resilient global society. RMS is working with industry clients and partners to do so by understanding emerging risks, identifying new opportunities to insure more risk, developing new risk transfer products, and creating new ways of measuring risk.

As Ben Brookes said, we only have to look at the recent events in Nepal to understand that there are huge opportunities – and needs – to improve resilience and the management of risk. RMS’ work for Metrocat, a catastrophe bond designed specifically to protect the New York MTA’s infrastructure against storm surge, showed the huge potential for the developing alternate methods of risk transfer in order to improve resilience.

And during his session, Daniel Stander pointed out that only 1.9% of the global economy is insured. As the world’s means of production shifts from assets to systems, RMS is working to understand how to understand systems of risk, starting with marine, supply chain, and cyber risk, tackling tough questions such as:

  • What are the choke points in the global shipping network, and how do they respond under stress?
  • How various events create a ripple effect that impact the global supply chain – for example, why did the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan cause a shortage of iPads in Australia, halt production at BMW in Germany, and enable a booming manufacturing industry in Guangzhou?
  • How do we measure cyber risk when technology has become so critical that it is systemically important to the global economy?

global shipping

Leaving the keynotes, a clear theme rang true: as the world becomes more interconnected, it is the intersection of innovation in science and technology that will enable us to scale and solve global problems head on.

Fighting Emerging Pandemics With Catastrophe Bonds

By Dr. Gordon Woo, catastrophe risk expert

When a fire breaks out in a city, there needs to be a prompt firefighting response to contain the fire and prevent it from spreading. The outbreak of a major fire is the wrong time to hold discussions on the pay of firefighters, to raise money for the fire service, or to consider fire insurance. It is too late.

Like fire, infectious disease spreads at an exponential rate. On March 21, 2014, an outbreak of Ebola was confirmed in Guinea. In April, it would have cost a modest sum of $5 million to control the disease, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). In July, the cost of control had reached $100 million; by October, it had ballooned to $1 billion. Ebola acts both as a serial killer and loan shark. If money is not made available rapidly to deal with an outbreak, many more will suffer and die, and yet more money will be extorted from reluctant donors.

Photo credits: Flickr/©afreecom/Idrissa Soumaré

An Australian nurse, Brett Adamson, working for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), summed up the frustration of medical aid workers in West Africa, “Seeing the continued failure of the world to respond fast enough to the current situation I can only assume I will see worse. And this I truly dread”

One of the greatest financial investments that can be made is for the control of emerging pandemic disease. The return can be enormous: one dollar spent early can save twenty dollars or more later. Yet the Ebola crisis of 2014 was marked by unseemly haggling by governments over the failure of others to contribute their fair share to the Ebola effort. The World Bank has learned the crucial risk management lesson: finance needs to be put in place now for a future emerging pandemic.

At the World Economic Forum held in Davos between January 21-24, 2015, the World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, himself a physician, outlined a plan to create a global fund that would issue bonds to finance important pandemic-fighting measures, such as training healthcare workers in advance. The involvement of the private sector is a key element in this strategy. Capital markets can force governments and NGOs to be more effective in pandemic preparedness. Already, RMS has had discussions with the START network of NGOs over the issuance of emerging pandemic bonds to fund preparedness. One of their brave volunteers, Pauline Cafferkey, has just recovered from contracting Ebola in Sierra Leone.

The market potential for pandemic bonds is considerable; there is a large volume of socially responsible capital to be invested in these bonds, as well as many companies wishing to hedge pandemic risks.

RMS has unique experience is this area. Our LifeRisks models are the only stochastic excess mortality models to have been used in a 144A transaction, and we have undertaken the risk analyses for all 144A excess mortality capital markets transactions issued since the 2009 (swine) flu pandemic.

Excess mortality (XSM) bonds modeled by RMS  
Vita Capital IV Ltd 2010
Kortis Capital Ltd 2010
Vita Capital IV Ltd. (Series V and VI) 2011
Vita Capital V 2012
Mythen Re Ltd. (Series 2012-2)XSM modeled by RMS 2012
Atlas IX Capital Limited (Series 2013-1) 2013

With this unique experience, RMS is best placed to undertake the risk analysis for this new developing market, which some insiders believe has the potential to grow bigger than the natural catastrophe bond market.

RMS and the FIFA World Cup: Insuring Against Terrorism

As we reflect back on this year’s World Cup, which wrapped up without interruption after Germany’s victory on Sunday, it is clear that FIFA’s financial position is much stronger now than in 2006, due in part to the availability of terrorism insurance.

Eleven years ago, the global elite of the soccer world learned about innovative RMS risk analysis to help FIFA to prepare for the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Sponsorship money was essential for FIFA’s cash flow and sponsors insisted on having insurance coverage against event cancellation. After 9/11, terrorism insurance became a necessity, but was available only through Warren Buffet, the astute insurer of last resort, and was extremely expensive. So, FIFA pursued alternative risk transfer to the capital markets through a catastrophe bond.

FIFA’s bankers at Credit Suisse turned to RMS to do what had been thought impossible – to get a terrorism risk securitization rated. It took multiple RMS meetings with Moody’s in London and New York over the course of a year to present and discuss the unique terrorism risk analysis and eventually secure an investment grade rating for Golden Goal Finance Ltd. This $260 million deal remains to this day the only stand-alone securitization of terrorism risk. Prospects for further terrorism risk securitizations depend on the scope of the U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which will be renewed at the end of 2014 with some further incremental reduction in the role of the federal government, but RMS was instrumental in instituting the precursors to these prospects.

Securitization of the cancellation risk of the 2006 World Cup was feasible in part due to the national importance of the event, which received extensive counter-terrorism protection.

While cancellation was still the biggest risk this year, the predominant local threat to the World Cup was disruption by public protest and riot. Following the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, there has been a surge of demand for international riot insurance, with a commensurate interest in riot analysis. As with terrorism, security is particularly crucial for the control of riot risk. With 170,000 Brazilian security personnel on duty for the month of the soccer tournament, insurers were able to enjoy the matches without concern that the July 13 final in Rio would be delayed.

While terrorism insurance is more widely available than in the past, it is still in short supply. Expanding modeling capabilities and increased demand for products such as terrorism and riot insurance will result in more insurance-linked securities (ILS) transactions such as the 2006 catastrophe bond, and ultimately promote a more resilient society.