The revised earthquake coverages and caps proposed by the New Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC) came into law as planned on July 1, 2019. As noted in an RMS blog back in February, these well signaled changes – to increase the building coverage from NZ$100,000 to NZ$150,000 and remove the NZ$20,000 contents cover, only had a small effect on the gross average annual loss for both EQC and the private market. Swapping the first layer of contents exposure for a larger, higher layer of building exposure produced a result that was close to neutral.
Examining the Exceedance Probability (EP) curve (see figure 1 below), the changes are small across all return periods. There are small increases in loss for the private market at short return periods (which produce the small increase in average annual loss reported earlier) but very little change at long return periods.
Critically, the modeled gross 1000-year loss to the private market is essentially unchanged, meaning there are no implications with regards to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) solvency requirements. Further, these EQC coverage changes are not expected to affect the peril balance driving trans-Tasman solvency considerations where both the RBNZ and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) standards must be met.
Across the global risk management community, we are bombarded by new information every day. As risk professionals we have to prioritize how we give our attention to new information. From an RMS perspective, when we release new model insights, we know there is a need to be concise and boil down huge research projects into just the important details. But there is a concern that the top-level results get taken as a uniform value that can be applied across the board, losing vital nuance.
When RMS released its New Zealand Earthquake High-Definition (HD) model in mid-2016, an important message was that the annual average loss (AAL) had increased by 30 percent. The ground-up, all-lines, countrywide AAL increased 30 percent relative to the previous version of the model released in 2007. An increase in loss came as no surprise after the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence of 2010/11 – see our New Zealand earthquake blogs.
The HD model was launched at two industry seminars in Wellington and Auckland and came with online documentation: some 44 pages of Understanding Changes in Results and 114 pages of model methodology, supplementary materials on our RMS OWL client portal and a team of modelers happy to talk about their work.
Faced with this information, one approach is to note that the New Zealand market is very consolidated so industry figures should be useful guides for actual portfolios. Let’s just use the old model and scale it by 30 percent. “She’ll be right”, as they like to say in New Zealand. But with two models being so different, this scaling-up would not make sense. Why are they so different?
Around 98 percent of residential homes in New Zealand have earthquake insurance. This remarkable achievement is due to a unique partnership between the New Zealand government Earthquake Commission (EQC) working together with the insurance industry. From its origins in 1945 as the Earthquake and War Damage Commission – renamed as the EQC in 1993, the Commission is supported by an Act of Parliament which sees the Crown as the insurer of first resort for earthquakes in New Zealand. The EQC provides the first layer of coverage for 1.84 million residential properties across the country, with the private market delivering cover over this initial layer.
The EQC administers the New Zealand Natural Disaster Fund (NDF) which receives monies directly passed on by private insurers, from a flat rate levy imposed on all households who purchase a homeowner insurance policy. The EQC is also responsible for investing the fund and ensuring there is adequate reinsurance cover available.
The NDF has supported the country’s homeowners through a series of damaging events since the start of this decade, providing NZ$100,000 (US$67,332) of buildings and NZ$20,000 (US$13,466) of contents cover for each event. Before the Canterbury earthquakes in 2011-12, the NDF had NZ$6.4 billion (US$4.27 billion). By 2018, including payments for the Kaikoura earthquake in 2016, the NDF had just NZ$287 million (US$195 million) left and was perilously close to the NZ$200 million limit where the government is mandated to top up the fund.
There has always been a balance between cross-subsidy and property-specific, risk-based underwriting and pricing in insurance, particularly for homeowners’ policies. While an actuary can easily quantify differences in fire risk for houses constructed from wood versus concrete based on claims, this becomes much more difficult when the peril concerned is infrequent, such as for earthquake or flood. Clearly risk models help to bridge this gap, but facilitating a move from cross-subsidy to risk-based pricing is more complex than simply using risk analytics. Factors such as regulation, market conditions, distribution channels and insurer IT systems all determine whether individual insurers and markets will move towards greater differentiation of risk. This is not to mention the political dimension of insurance affordability and social equity.