Tag Archives: global terrorism landscape

Terrorism Modeling: The Challenges of Keeping One Step Ahead

A version of this article was published by Insurance Day

Terrorism is asymmetric warfare, and terrorism risk analysis entails knowing not only what has occurred in past terrorist campaigns, but also everything that could have occurred. Carl von Clausewitz, the foremost Prussian military theorist, insisted that perfecting the art of warfare entailed knowing not only what had occurred in previous wars, but also everything that could have occurred. The catalog of successful terrorist attacks is only a small subset of the much longer list of terrorist plots, most of which have been interdicted through the diligent surveillance and pre-emptive action of the counter-terrorism forces.

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Will a Clearer Picture Emerge for Terrorism Insurers?

What a difference a week makes. A week before the tragic events in Manchester, RMS was in New York, and the previous week in London as we hosted over 400 risk professionals from across the (re)insurance industry at two half day terrorism seminars. The seminars featured several of the world’s leading experts on counterterrorism, modeling, and terrorism risk management and highlighted the fluid threat environment, its insurance implications, and the impact of technology on terrorism risk. Continue reading

The Orlando Shootings – and What They Tell Us About the Evolving Threat from Islamic State

This month saw what the President of the United States described as “the most deadly shooting in American history” with the killing of 49 innocent people at an Orlando nightclub, carried out by a man suspected of having leanings towards radical Islamist ideology.

Although information is still emerging, there are some clear threads and patterns, which link this attack to the increasing activity surrounding so-called Islamic State (IS).

1. Assaults Using an Automatic Rifle Becoming More Common

For somebody committed to terrorizing the population, there appears to be a growing tendency to use automatic weapons. Off-the-shelf military weapons are inherently more reliable than improvised explosive devices. In contrast to the atrocity in Orlando, a 2007 plot against the Tiger Tiger nightclub in London failed because the IED (improvised explosive device) failed to detonate.

2. The Increase in “Lone Wolf” Attacks as a Response to Surveillance

A “lone wolf” attack has been defined as a single individual or a group of two to three people driven to hateful actions based on a particular set of beliefs without a larger group’s knowledge or support. The FBI believes that most U.S. domestic attacks are carried out by lone actors to promote their own grievances and agendas.

Militants involved in such attacks are home-grown “self-starters” that are inspired by the jihadi movement, but may have little or no actual connection to these groups. Instead, many use the internet and social networking tools to find propaganda and research attack methods.

Mass interception of communications (as revealed by Edward Snowden’s leaks of National Security Agency files), particularly in North America, has raised the chances of terrorist conspiracies being detected. This has led to a move away from plots involving multiple attackers. There has been a corresponding rise in the United States in the risk of lone-actor attacks, which have a comparatively small chance of being found out and stopped.

3. Attacks Inspired by Islamic State

The Orlando terrorist contacted police via cellphone around the time of the attack to announce his allegiance to IS. There are strong indications that he has been deeply influenced by the group even if he had no contact with it. As IS concedes territory it controls in Iraq and Syria it is looking to organize or inspire atrocities overseas. There are two likely reasons for this. Firstly, striking on foreign soil helps to divert attention from its losses in the Middle East in order to retain credibility and an aura of potency. Second, the jihadi operations overseas are designed to deter further attacks by Western forces in IS strongholds in Iraq and Syria.

4. Targeting of Venues Which Extremists Claim Symbolize Values They Decry

Bars and nightclubs may feature in the attack plans of terrorist organizations because there are high concentrations of people in a public, accessible venue. Such locations are also targets for such extremists who may view them as representing Western lifestyles of which they disapprove.

5. Increased Attacks over Ramadan

The murders in Orlando happened a week after the start of the holy month of Ramadan. Radical Islamic militants tend to increase their operations during this period.  A recording released online from IS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani has claimed any martyrdom operation during the festival of Ramadan will bring more “rewards.” An increase in the tempo of Islamist terrorist activity would thus not be unexpected.

The increasing proliferation of extremism and global attacks is concerning. Our modeling team closely monitors the evolving risk landscape. By examining all attacks to capture greater insight into the workings and thinking of the terrorist groups, including targeting preferences and weapon selection, we can continue to offer terrorism models that enable our clients to deepen their understanding of terrorism risk and strengthen their terrorism risk management.

This post was co-authored by Weimeng Yeo and Gordon Woo. 

Weimeng Yeo

Principal Modeler, Model Development
Weimeng Yeo is a principal modeler on the Model Development team at Risk Management Solutions (RMS), and is a key member of the team responsible for the development of RMS’ terrorism modeling solutions. Prior to his tenure at RMS, Weimeng worked at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore. He received his bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Colby College in Maine and a Master’s degree in International Affairs from Georgetown University in Washington DC at the School of Foreign Service.

Western Jihadists and the Risk They Pose to Their Homeland

Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, foreign jihadists from across the globe have travelled to Syria to fight the Assad regime. According to a report by the 9/11 commission, the civil war in Syria has attracted around 10,000 foreign fighters from more than 80 countries. A growing number of these foreign fighter contingents have also returned to Iraq determined to reignite sectarian tension in the region. While the majority of non-Syrian fighters are Middle Eastern, the influx of European, American, and Canadian born fighters is significant. A study done by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London on the number of foreign fighters in Syria found that 18% are from the West. Britons make up one of the biggest groups of Western fighters with Danes, Italians, and French not far behind.

The news that American Douglas McCain was killed while fighting in Syria also indicates that there are Americans currently in Syria fighting against the Assad regime. In February this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the US Congress that more than 50 Americans are thought to be fighting in Syria. Canada has also seen a rise in homegrown jihadists going overseas to fight. According to a report done by the Public Safety Canada, an estimated 130 Canadians have joined overseas conflicts, many of them gravitating toward Syria and Iraq to wage jihad. The influx of overseas jihadists is unprecedented. The figures exceed the number of foreign jihadists involved in Afghanistan during its decade of war and its subsequent violent aftermath. Unlike in Afghanistan, many are travelling overseas not to just train or provide financial logistical support, but to also participate in the conflict directly.

There are many reasons why so many individuals have traveled to Iraq and Syria to wage jihad. Many have been drawn in by predictions in a version of Islamic ideology that the apocalypse will take place in Greater Syria. Such narrative has been inflamed by stories of atrocities against Sunni Muslims alleged to be committed by the Alawite Assad regime.

Accessibility is also a factor. In contrast to other jihadi theaters such as in Afghanistan, Mali, and Somalia, Iraq and Syria are much more logistically accessible. Europol reports that many foreign jihadists have traveled through Turkey, a common vacation destination, which arouses no or limited suspicion. Most of the foreign jihadists have been assimilated to ISIL, also referred to as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), but not exclusively. Some have joined other salafi-jihadi rebel groups such as the Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.

These groups were founded by individuals who at one time were senior members of al-Qaida. They tend to be more inclusive, highly organized, and much better financed than their more moderate counterparts such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The foreign fighters are not only getting indoctrinated ideologically, but are also given training on operational tactics. Many are instructed in using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and suicide attacks.

From a threat perspective, foreign jihadi involvement in both Iraq and Syria could impact the global terrorism risk landscape in multiple ways. First, the returning jihadis potentially could revitalize their cause in their homeland and act as a conduit reconnecting local groups to the global jihad. Second and more importantly, there is also a risk that some of these veterans may attempt a terrorist attacks back in their homeland. While the majority of jihadist foreign fighters do not end up attacking their home countries, a small number do and they often prove more capable and proficient than those without any fighting experience.

Given the stronger counter terrorism environment in the West, such attacks will more likely fall under the category of lone wolf terrorism attacks. These are individuals who work alone or in very small groups and do not seek any type of external assistance to execute their operation thus making it difficult for the authorities to gather enough intelligence to thwart any potential attack. Returning jihadists with proficiency in the local language and the ability to understand Western society can execute and plan their terrorism plot without raising much suspicion. While these homegrown lone wolf plots are much harder to detect and stop, their attacks tend to be limited to smaller attack types.

Current counter-terrorism practitioners assert that ISIS and its foreign contingent are interested in attacking western cities but question whether they have the ability to orchestrate a large-scale attack such a car bomb in cities such as in Toronto or London given the strong counter terrorism environment in these cities. Thus, it appears lone wolf attacks such as assassinations, beheadings, and kidnappings are the more likely scenarios. Despite these changes in the global terrorism landscape, RMS continues to recommend clients to use the standard risk outlook for its suite of probabilistic terrorism models.