

July 2010 Overview of Terrorism Risk: **Al-Qaeda continues to morph its structure in response to the ever changing security landscape.**

Recommended Risk Outlook for use in U.S. Terrorism Risk Model: **RMS Standard (2011)**

## CHANGING FACE OF TERRORISM

**The update of the RMS U.S. Terrorism Risk Model for 2011 has entailed a review of terrorism activity worldwide and a detailed examination of disrupted preparation for attacks that have occurred in the United States. New trends in threat groups have also been incorporated.**

RMS has completed its ninth annual release of the U.S. Terrorism Risk Model, including a detailed threat review. Overall, the expected annual insured loss in the U.S. for next year is 12% lower than this year. This past year has indeed proved to be an active year in terms of thwarted plots emanating from jihadist actors in America. As of 2010, there have been 33 known macro-terrorism plots perpetrated in the U.S., with 6 foiled plots occurring in the span of the last 12 months. Nevertheless, the recent flurry of activity is likely to dissipate in the face of increased counter-terrorism activity by the U.S. security agencies, but it does show that individuals and cliques inspired by Al-Qaeda's ideology remain a powerful threat, and capable of causing major losses to insurers in America.

Al-Qaeda continues to change rapidly in response to U.S. and international pressure. Unlike the 9/11 attacks, the militants involved in executing the recent terrorist plots in the U.S. were almost exclusively homegrown operatives, and not individuals dispatched by the Al-Qaeda core. We anticipate that this dynamic to continue, and if anything, the trend will be for homegrown jihadi groups to increase the tempo of their activity. These homegrown jihadi groups are trying to remain one step ahead of U.S. counter-terrorism officials by evolving methods of targeting and employing tactics that enable them to avoid security measures. However, stronger counter-terrorism efforts in the U.S. will help to curb the threat. With better government investments, improved intelligence sharing and more effective counter-terrorism policies the operational space needed for terrorists to function will be curbed. The efforts by DHS and other U.S. security agencies will help to improve the interdiction rate in stopping attempted attacks, particularly the larger scale plots in America.

Without external assistance and support, most of these terrorism plots by homegrown jihadi groups have been amateurish. They have lacked the basic skills to mount any sort of sophisticated attack. Nevertheless, recent plots have shown that plotters are trying to reach out for external support. The perpetrators are now travelling overseas to establish contacts with various jihadist outfits to acquire operational skills. In the future, it is likely that a homegrown cell with the skills and knowledge obtained from Al-Qaeda or another external source will reach a sufficient operational acumen to execute a successful macro attack against the American homeland.

Conventional explosives have so far remained the weapons of choice by the homegrown jihadi groups with smaller bombs to circumvent security measures the likelier attack mode. Such weapons can cause significant numbers of casualties. They are also relatively easy to acquire and use. The basic arsenal runs the gamut of conventional weapons: improvised explosive, incendiary devices, as well as standard military weapons such as automatic rifles, grenades, mortars, and surface-to-air missiles.

The failed terror attack on a U.S. flight to Detroit clearly shows that jihadi communities have not given up on their efforts to damage the aviation industry and disrupt commercial travel. Commercial airliners continue to be a key target for terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda is aware of the frailty of the airline industry and the impact of attacks against it on the economy. Even with increased security measures it has not been possible to stop Al-Qaeda attempting repeated attacks. Expect more attacks related to the aviation industry.

A chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon (CBRN) attack also cannot be discounted. Intelligence reports continue to indicate that Al-Qaeda is still interested in acquiring CBRN materials. However, evidence exists that Al-Qaeda

and its associate groups have yet to translate its interest in CBRN weapons to tangible capabilities. The current disaggregated state of "Al-Qaeda central" would seem to preclude its ability to manufacture CBRN weapons for large-scale attacks in the short-to-medium term. Thus, it is likely that in the short term the CBRN threat will come from a simple chemical, biological, or radiological weapon, which homegrown terrorist cells may potentially attempt to develop.

The RMS U.S. Target Database continues to reflect the city and target type prioritizations of radical Islamic militant terrorist groups worldwide. These patterns are likely to be sustained in 2011. The target database has been expanded to include places of worship. Places of worship and their congregations are targeted by terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, because of their view that their jihad is between the Muslims on one side and Christians and Jews on the other. Most at risk are churches or synagogues where there are perceptions amongst Al-Qaeda and their affiliates that the people involved with these sites are proselytizing. Apart from adding a new target category, there were changes made in the city tiers as well. The cities of Dallas in Texas, Jersey City and Newark in Jersey have moved up by a tier. While these cities may not be a target of the magnitude of New York City, being a larger metropolitan city in the U.S. makes them attractive targets.

**The ninth annual update of the RMS Terrorism product suite will be released in August 2010, incorporating parameterization of terrorism risk for 2011. Documentation on the U.S. Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Model: Parameterization for 2011, is available to clients on request.**

## JIHADISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

**Radical Islamic militancy is not a new phenomenon in Western Europe. During the early 1990s, radical Islamic militant groups made this region a logistical base for local insurgencies. It was suitable as a sanctuary because of the region's lax asylum legislations and relatively open borders. However, in the last few years these logistics cells have become operational significantly altering the regional terrorism landscape.**

Although the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in terrorism activities, Islamist extremists that advocate terrorism have become a grave security concern for the European security agencies. The jihadists in Europe have unified under Al-Qaeda's virulent ideology and consider European states legitimate and prioritized targets. These groups threaten these countries that are perceived as enemies of Islam and designated as "legitimate" targets due to their involvement in Iraq or in Afghanistan. These groups have staged mass attacks in Spain and the UK, while many other similar plots have been foiled or failed on their territory.

According to our research, jihadists under the Al-Qaeda banner have prepared more than 40 "spectaculars" or massive attacks in Europe since September 11, 2001. Based on the series of plots and successful attacks in Europe, the larger and more populated European countries such as France, Germany, United Kingdom and Italy are at a higher risk. Moreover, there are strong signs that smaller terrorism cells also exist even in traditionally "quiet" areas such as Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.

The targets selected either had strategic or symbolic values (e.g. military bases, embassies, parliament buildings, churches, synagogues, landmarks). The attacks were also meant to inflict as many casualties as possible. The United States' government or military facilities have also frequently selected targets in Western Europe. In a majority of the plots, the perpetrators intended to use improvised explosive devices such as homemade fertilizer bombs to execute their attack. However, ominously in a few cases, they also planned to employ unconventional weapons such as ricin and cyanide to execute a mass casualty event.

At present, the most serious threat to Europe emanates from the local jihadist networks. These jihadist networks belong to the radical Salafi-Jihadi circles, an Islamist doctrine which is based on a strict interpretation of Quran that emphasizes the need for armed jihad. These jihadists are the new converts to Al-Qaeda. They have no formal links with Bin Laden, but are willing to support Al-Qaeda due to its appealing ideology. The rising proliferation of local jihadi networks in Europe signifies that the threat of terrorism no longer solely comes from foreign centrally organised groups like Al-Qaeda. Today self-radicalized groups composed of people who have had their upbringing and cultural influence in the European world poses a growing threat to these countries.

This shift from a coherent centralized Al-Qaeda to a loose network of clandestine cells has made it significantly harder for intelligence agencies to keep track. However, their autonomy also limits their growth and in most cases these groups will require external assistance before they are able to launch an attack. A case in point is the European jihadi plots where overseas travel and international contacts have been contributing factors in their shift from logistical to operational ones.

The threat of homegrown terrorism in Europe is unlikely to diminish in the coming years. The political tension between Israel and Palestine, and the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by foreign troops has increased the "political oxygen" that fuels the spread of the jihadist movement, causing an increase of recruits to such groups. More effort is needed to increase community building and enhance common shared values to lessen the attractiveness of radical Islam. In particular, the ideology of "*killing in Allah's name*" needs to be reversed by stronger engagement with Muslim communities. It is only by winning the hearts and minds of Muslim communities that this threat can be averted.

**As part of Risk Management Solutions' expansion of its terrorism modelling development, we have developed a new terrorism probabilistic model for nine key international cities in six countries. The cities included in the RMS model are: Ankara, Copenhagen, Dublin, Istanbul, London, Milan, Montreal, Rome/Vatican, and Toronto. It will provide event-based stochastic modelling of terrorism attacks using the methodology developed for the U.S. Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Model.**

## NEW YORK'S TIMES SQUARE TERRORISM ATTACK

**A car bomb scare in New York City's Times Square is a strong reminder of the home grown terrorism threat in America.**

Times Square was evacuated the weekend May 1 after New York authorities found a crude but potentially powerful bomb that began to detonate but did not explode in a smoking sport utility vehicle. The vehicle is believed to have contained three barbecue-grill-sized propane tanks, fireworks, two five-gallon gasoline containers and two clocks with batteries, electrical wire and other components. Timers were connected to a 16-ounce can filled with fireworks that were apparently intended to set the gas cans alight then ignite the propane tanks. These explosive materials have a theoretical yield equivalent to between 200 lbs and 800 lbs of TNT. However, it is very unlikely the full yield of the energy contained in the improvised explosive device (IED) could be obtained, and in the actual event, the explosives were unable to be detonated at all.

An American citizen of Pakistani descent, Faisal Shahzad, is now in custody for the failed attack. The accused conforms to the model of decentralized terrorism inspired groups such as Al-Qaeda. This concept is defined by key Al-Qaeda strategist Mustafa Al-Suri's doctrine of *nizam la tanzim* (system, not organization). In his view, the future of jihad consists of small autonomous groups having decentralized organizational structures with no official links to Al-Qaeda leadership, so even if the senior hierarchy dismantled, the threat from Al-Qaeda will persist.

This failed terrorism plot is consistent with the attack trends and target preferences incorporated in RMS' U.S. terrorism model. RMS assesses that terrorist groups will most likely use an improvised explosive device (IED) in densely populated urban areas and this attack - at the eastern corner of the 1 Astor Plaza building in the bustling streets of Mid-Town Manhattan at Times Square - clearly illustrates this point. Also consistent with RMS terrorism modeling is the timing of the detonation which indicates that the plotters were intending to cause a mass casualty event. Broadway show goers were completing their dinner and heading for several plays in the area around the detonated time of 6:30 in the evening. The assault is similar to the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United Kingdom three years ago where the theater district in London was the target of a propane bomb attacks. Jihadi groups have a history of using propane and gasoline to enhance the force of explosives. This includes the suicide attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in 1983 at the Beirut airport in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. service members as well as the 2007 attempted car bombing of London nightclubs (which similarly failed to detonate) and the follow-on attack on the international airport in Glasgow, Scotland.

The use of gasoline and propane is an inventive way to achieve a much larger explosion using unmonitored materials. Thankfully, this is much more technically-challenging to accomplish for any terrorist group. Neither gasoline nor propane gas is explosive on its own but a mixture of them with air within narrow composition limits would be explosive. The attackers may have been planning that some proportion of the fuel would ignite explosively, or that the burning gasoline could cause the propane tanks to explode. The explosive air mixture is extremely hard to achieve and certainly would not be obtained within a small volume like the inside of a car. A fuel-air explosion creates a larger blast zone than a TNT explosion for the same energy yield: it creates less overpressure at its detonation point, so is less destructive at the center of the blast, but higher overpressures with distance, causing more damage over a larger area. The attack once again demonstrates that terrorists are growing more ambitious in their attack modes. Fortunately in this case, their ambitions outstripped their technical capabilities and the large, mass-casualty explosion that they hoped for failed to materialize. Strong counter-terrorism efforts will also help to curb the threat in America. Better government investments, improved intelligence sharing and more effective counter-terrorism policies have limited the operational space needed for terrorists to function. The efforts by DHS and other U.S. security agencies has helped to improve the interdiction rate in stopping attempted attacks, particularly larger scale plots such as this one.

**Licensees of the RiskLink Terrorism Scenario Model or the Probabilistic Terrorism Model wanting to assess the potential impact of the attempted attack at 1 Astor Plaza (Target ID 4044) are advised to use the 600lb car bomb scenario (ID 100) – this will produce a conservative loss estimate for the event as even if the IED had successfully detonated, the yield would have been less than 600 lb. The use of Fuel Air Explosion attack modes will be kept under review and incorporated in future modeling if terrorists appear likely to succeed in using them successfully.**

## AL-QAEDA'S RESURGENCE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

**On December 25, 2009, American authorities arrested a Nigerian named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab aboard a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on charges of having tried to blow up the plane with smuggled explosives. This failed attack has been linked to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The appearance of AQAP has once again re-focused the jihadi terrorism threat away from South Asia and back to the Middle East.**

Yemen, the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, has always been a hotbed for jihadi activity. Her impoverished economy and unstable political landscape has helped to produce Al-Qaeda operatives long before a formal branch of Al-Qaeda was established in the country. Several Yemeni citizens were involved in the initial Al-Qaeda campaigns such as the East African bombings in 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. However, by January 2009, a more formal organization started to emerge. Its members reportedly were drawn from a new generation of Yemeni militants as well as Al-Qaeda Saudi operatives who fled to Yemen to avoid death or capture. Many of these militants either fought coalition forces in Iraq or were radicalized in the Yemeni prison system. In fact, many AQAP leaders were among those freed in a now infamous jailbreak in 2006, in which 23 convicted terrorists escaped from a supposedly high-security prison in the capital of Sana'a.

AQAP is an established branch of Al-Qaeda and is a vital part of the organization's global war taking place in the region. The main strategic goal of AQAP is to dismantle current political entities in the Arabian Peninsula, thus, paving a way for their establishment of a Caliphate in the peninsula. Al-Qaeda also strongly believes liberating the Arabian Peninsula is an essential step to liberating Palestine. According to Osama Bin Laden in his speech on Palestine in 2009, Al-Qaeda will mobilize four militias that will help free Palestine: one army from Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and the last from the Levant. AQAP will be responsible for establishing the army that will be launched from Yemen.

The AQAP stands out among other Al-Qaeda associated groups for the following reasons. First, AQAP succeeded in merging the myriad jihadi groups in the country into a single entity. Second, their leadership has strong ties with the Al-Qaeda core in South Asia. Third, the organization functions and operates in a manner greatly reminiscent of a traditionally structured Al-Qaeda node." Fourth, the organization established a *Sharia* council, and has begun to issue *fatwas* in their own name, indicating the group's independent-mindedness and autonomy. Lastly, AQAP has succeeded in building an alliance with the tribal system in Yemen, providing them the safe haven needed for them to expand.

The spread of AQAP in Yemen poses a direct threat to Western interests. AQAP has a stronghold in the eastern and southern regions of Yemen. From these regions, they can eventually take control over the Gulf of Aden and particularly the *Bab el-Mandab* Strait. The *Bab el-Mandab* Strait, between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Oil and other exports from the Persian Gulf must pass through the *Bab el-Mandab* Strait before entering the Suez Canal. More than 2.1 million barrels of oil a day, goes through the Bab el-Mandab to the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean.

AQAP has shown it has the ability to execute larger macro attacks. Since 2006, AQAP has committed more than sixteen macro incidents. This Al-Qaeda franchise has carried out a string of attacks, including an attack on the U.S. Embassy in September 2008, kidnapping of several groups of foreign tourists, and attempts to terrorize Yemen's own security services. Similarly, we must also be mindful of the global dimension of the AQAP threat. The threat from AQAP is not only inside Yemen but also outside the country. Examples of its new global reach include the attempt to assassinate Saudi Deputy Minister of the Interior Prince Muhammad bin Nayef and the attack on the Northwest Airlines plane heading from Amsterdam to Detroit.

**Currently, RMS assess that AQAP is the single most active branch of Al-Qaeda. The group will continue to leverage the capabilities of its associate groups such as AQAP to attack the U.S. homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQAP will help Al-Qaeda to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives.**

## DOMESTIC MICRO-TERRORISM IN THE U.S.

**By far the greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. comes from individuals following the path of militant Islam. However, on a lesser scale, there is a continuing threat from political extremists. Violent activist groups espousing individual causes, such as environmental or animal rights as well as right-wing militant groups continue to be highly active. A change in strategy among such terrorist groups invites a reassessment of U.S. domestic micro-terrorism.**

Inspired by Edward Abbey's 1975 novel, "The Monkey Wrench Gang," eco-terrorism groups initially employed comparatively benign forms of activism, such as vandalizing logging trucks and releasing laboratory test animals. However, federal law enforcement officials have noted a steady progression from so-called monkey-wrenching tactics to more violent acts of property destruction.

Consider first the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Most attacks by the ALF are best categorized as vandalism, causing more nuisance than financial loss. This year, actions include gluing locks on buildings, damaging windows with corrosive acid, and painting graffiti. More serious are attacks involving arson. Incendiary devices have been planted, burning down several buildings. The most significant was an arson attack staged on May 10, 2010, which gutted a sheepskin factory in Glendale, Colorado. Company losses were estimated at \$0.5 million, but the owner lacked insurance cover on machinery and inventory.

A more destructive attack track record belongs to ALF's sister organization, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). On August 1, 2003, a 206-unit condominium being built in San Diego was burnt down causing damage in excess of \$50 million. On March 3, 2008, ELF used explosive devices to set fire to four multi-million dollar homes in Washington State, causing \$7 million of damage. Nevertheless, growths of these groups have been curtailed due to increased government scrutiny. In dealing with this particular terrorist threat, the FBI have been very successful in identifying ELF activists, partly through informants, who have 'snitched' on their comrades.

There has also been an encouraging change in ELF policy. According to the ELF website, *'A critical evaluation of past ELF actions exposes the obvious: arson is a dangerous and irrational strategy. There are no winners. Torching sport utility vehicles, ski resorts, research labs and McMansions, releases huge amounts of toxic gasses into the atmosphere - creating far more greenhouse gasses than if they were left alone. The end result: everything is rebuilt, replaced or repaired. This doubles the burden on the environment and taxpayers! An exercise in futility and self-defeat.'* With this more enlightened ELF strategy, the combined terrorism insurance losses from future ALF/ELF action should be well assimilated within the loss burden from criminal vandalism and arson, and not require risk modelling.

In regards to right-wing terrorist groups, they are likely to be dispersed widely throughout the country, reflecting pockets of support across the nation. During the last few years, right-wing terrorist groups like the white supremacist and violent antigovernment groups have been largely rhetorical and have not indicated plans to carry out violent acts. Nevertheless, the consequences of a prolonged economic downturn could create a fertile recruiting environment for right-wing extremists. These groups have also capitalized on the election of the first African-American president, and are focusing their efforts to recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their scope and appeal.

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security currently are very concerned with right-wing extremist groups and assess that they are the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States. However, as these groups tend to function as small terrorism cells of two to three individuals or of lone wolf operations, their attacks tend to be limited in magnitude and scope. Thus, while without involving larger numbers of operatives they are likely to remain within the micro-terror category, on a scale of criminal malicious action.

**The U.S. micro-terrorism threat is geographically diversified, and may be assimilated within the general loss burden of malicious damage. Accordingly, the RMS U.S. Terrorism Risk model no longer specifically includes micro-terrorism.**

**OTHER DEVELOPMENTS**

**Colleen Renee LaRose, 46, who called herself Jihad Jane, has been charged with terrorism-related crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder and providing material support to terrorists, 10 March, 2010.** She has been held in U.S. custody since October on suspicions that she provided material support to terrorists. According to the indictment filed in a federal court in Pennsylvania she allegedly recruited individuals in the United States, Europe and South Asia to "wage violent jihad". As a U.S. citizen whose appearance allowed her to blend into Western society, she represented one of the worst fears of U.S. security agencies.

**RMS hosted a seminar entitled "Strategies for Managing International Terrorism Risk" at Lloyd's Old Library in London, 13 April, 2010.** This complimentary half-day event provided an opportunity to learn about European terrorism threat, strategies being used by market-leading insurers to manage terrorism risk, and the expansion of the RMS Terrorism Model to major cities in Europe. The seminar brought together the world's leading terrorism experts to discuss how the global terrorism threat has evolved and the likely impact on the insurance industry.

**Al-Qaeda's third-ranking operative, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, has been killed in Pakistan, 15 May, 2010.** Yazid, was an original member of Al-Qaeda's leadership council and served as a senior adviser to Osama bin Laden for more than 15 years. More recently, he was the group's chief liaison official to the Taliban. Yazid was part of the Egyptian contingent that has dominated Al-Qaeda's leadership. He and Zawahiri served time in prison in the early 1980s for their role as conspirators in the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The death of Yazid represents one of the more significant blows against Al-Qaeda since the U.S. began a major escalation in the number of drone strikes in 2009.

**Militants armed with guns and suicide vests stormed two mosques in Lahore, Pakistan belonging to a minority sect, the Ahmadi community, killing 80 people in coordinated attacks, 28 May 2010.** The strikes highlight the threat to minority religious groups by the salafi-jihadi militants who have repeatedly attacked Pakistan's U.S.-allied government. Punjabi Taliban, a wing of the Pakistani Taliban, claimed responsibility for the attacks. The Ahmadis community are reviled as heretics by salafi-jihadis on the grounds that they do not accept the tenet of the Jihad, one of the basic principles of Islam.

**A report published by Guy Carpenter finds that the insurance industry is leveraging more on expert advice to monitor the dynamic nature of the terrorism threat, even as reinsurance supply continues to outpace demand, 2 June, 2010.** The report, available at [www.guycarp.com](http://www.guycarp.com) also highlights the increase sophistication and the use of models such as the RMS terrorism solutions to allow insurers to better quantify their exposure to potential incidents and highlight concentrated areas in their portfolios. Reinsurers are also eager to place more terrorism business, though demand continues to lag supply.

**Two men from New Jersey were arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport as they were allegedly trying to board separate flights on their way to join the terrorist group the Al Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda associated group, 7 June, 2010.** The case is the latest in a terrorism trend that worries American authorities: young American men, from Somali immigrant families, being drawn to leave the U.S. and travel to that country for terrorism training. The U.S. security agencies have been investigating and arresting such men across the country for more than a year.

## FORTHCOMING RMS EVENTS

### **RMS U.S. Terrorism Seminar, New York Wednesday July 14, 2010**

The attempted car bombing of New York City's Times Square demonstrated that the threat of terrorism still persists in the United States. In February, the CIA director warned that the biggest threat is not that we face an attack like 9/11, but that Al-Qaeda is adapting its methods in ways that often make it difficult to detect, and security services may be faced with simple rather than complex terror plots and devices in the near future. The Times Square bomb plot was a stark realization of this warning of the continued Jihadi terrorist threat. This seminar will assess the changing face of terrorism, and its implications for terrorism insurance, and will offer an unsurpassed platform to learn from an international panel of experts.

The free half-day event will be held in New York City on Wednesday, July 14 at the Landmark Hudson Theatre of the Millennium Broadway Hotel. Advance registration required. Details and registration information available at: [http://www.rms.com/NewsPress/RMS\\_Events.asp](http://www.rms.com/NewsPress/RMS_Events.asp)

## RMS TERRORISM PRODUCTS

***U.S. Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Model Version 3.0***, will be released in the Summer of 2010 and incorporates parameterization for terrorism risk in the United States in 2011. Some of the primary features include:

- Updated analysis of terrorism risk from foreign or domestic terrorist organizations
- Conventional and CBRN attack modes
- Multiple Risk Outlooks for the terrorism threat environment in 2011: expected as well as increased and decreased risk perspectives

***International Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Model*** will be released in the Summer of 2010. It will provide event-based stochastic modeling of terrorism attacks using the methodology developed for the U.S. Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Model. It covers nine major commercial centres worldwide: London (UK); Toronto and Montreal (Canada); Milan and Rome (Italy); Copenhagen (Denmark); Ankara and Istanbul (Turkey); and Dublin (Ireland).

***RiskLink® and RiskBrowser® Version 10.0***, will be released in the Summer of 2010 and include worldwide capability for exposure and accumulation management and modeling terrorism scenarios with geocoding available in over 150 countries, including street-level resolution for Western Europe.

***Terrorism Risk Management System Version 2.1***, will be released in the Summer of 2010. It is designed for underwriters and portfolio managers to gain greater insight into their exposure to terrorism risk and make more informed decisions. The Terrorism Risk Management System has been designed to simplify the visualization of quantitative and qualitative data along with contextualized terrorism-specific data layers.