
January 2009 Overview of Terrorism Risk: Security heightens as new President enters the White House
Recommended Risk Outlook for use in U.S. Terrorism Risk Model: RMS Standard (2009)

GLOBAL THREAT ASSESSMENT 2009

Terrorism will continue to be the pre-eminent national security threat to most countries in 2009. The terrorist threat will spread from conflict zones to neighboring regions and countries. More threat groups will adopt Al Qaeda's methodology of suicide and ideology of global jihad. Using vehicle- and human-borne suicide attackers, terrorist groups in Asia, Africa and the Middle East will mount spectacular attacks against high profile, symbolic and iconic targets in urban cities.

The phased withdrawal of United States-led coalition forces from Iraq will create greater instability in Iraq and beyond. The Iraqi forces will fail to contain the violence. Iran will expand its covert and overt influence in Iraq. The threat from Iraq will spread to the Levant, Europe and beyond. Unless the U.S. is pragmatic in its withdrawal plans, Al Qaeda and its affiliates will use Iraq as a forward operational base to mount operations in the Middle East, North and Eastern Africa and the West.

Despite a dramatic increase in coalition forces stationed there, the terrorist threat will persist in Afghanistan. The answer to stability in Afghanistan rests in clearing the terrorist enclave on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) remains the epicenter of global terrorism, where Al Qaeda-led and -driven multiple threat groups plan, prepare and execute attacks globally. Unless and until the international community recognizes and assists Islamabad to dismantle Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban infrastructure in tribal Pakistan, the threat to the world will continue.

The conflict zones in the Middle East (particularly the Levant), East/Horn of Africa and South Asia (Pakistan and Afghanistan) will witness the highest level of threat. Threat groups operating in conflict zones will conduct Al Qaeda-style long range terrorist operations in neighboring regions and countries in the global south. The terrorist threat will be lowest in Northeast Asia (except Xinjiang) followed by Southeast Asia (except Indonesia).

The threat to North America, Europe and Australia will largely stem from politicized and radicalized segments of migrant and Diaspora communities. However, by increasing their intelligence penetration of radicalized segments of the Muslim communities, the Western security agencies will be able to manage the threat to their host countries, thereby stabilizing the risk.

The U.S.-led coalition intervention in Iraq in March 2003 has diverted military and intelligence resources away from key theaters of interest such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Seven years after 9-11, the core leadership of Al Qaeda that masterminded 9-11 is still free. After Iraq, Al Qaeda propaganda that the U.S. is deliberately killing Muslims and attacking Islam found resonance among Muslims globally. Today, there are more threat groups and greater Muslim participation and support for violence than at 9-11. The U.S. under President Obama is likely to invest more in strategic counter terrorism – ideological, educational, developmental, media, informatics response – aimed at winning Muslim hearts and minds. This point was echoed during Obama's inauguration speech, *"To the Muslim World, we seek a new way forward based on mutual interest and mutual respect."*

Understanding the threat is paramount to tactically and strategically reducing it. The global terrorist threat largely stems from conflict zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria, India (Kashmir), Russia (Chechnya) and China (Xingjiang) where Muslims are suffering. Both virulent ideologies and operational capabilities in those conflict zones spill over to neighboring regions and countries. While the bulk of the terrorist attacks will be detected and disrupted in the planning and preparation stages, a few attacks will be successful.

Operating out of FATA, Al Qaeda has transformed from an operational organization to training and an ideological movement. Using Al Sahab (the Cloud), Al Qaeda's multimedia arm, Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri and his son-in-law Abd-al Rahman Al Maghrebi, the head of the information committee, is radicalizing both territorial Muslims in the Global South and migrant/diaspora Muslims in the West. In 2009, Al Qaeda will forge more partnerships with likeminded regional groups. Local groups adopting the name Al Qaeda will become a trend. In 2009, it is very likely that Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (Turkistan Islamic Party) and at least another group will adopt the name Al Qaeda.

More terrorist and extremist groups will emulate Al Qaeda's appealing ideology and cost-effective methodology. While Al Qaeda's favored approach is to mount suicide attacks against high profile, symbolic and strategic targets to inflict mass fatalities and casualties, its ideology calls for attacks against both domestic governments and Western/Israeli targets. As the near simultaneous "no surrender" attacks in Mumbai demonstrated in November 2008, even groups that are not part of the Al Qaeda family, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), have adopted Al Qaeda-style attacks.

Likewise, a number of threat groups in the Palestinian territories will be inspired by the belief system and methodology of Al Qaeda. Although the bulk of the attacks will be mounted by Palestinian Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade, 2009 will witness both the emergence and strengthening of Al Qaeda-inspired groups in the Palestinian territories, especially after the recent Israeli raids on Gaza.

Afghanistan and Iraq will persist as the world's defining conflict zones. Muslim suffering, agony and resentment in those zones will galvanize Muslims worldwide. Although only a tiny minority of the Muslims support terrorism, the majority of Muslims will be reluctant to support Western presence in Muslim lands, even if it was well-intentioned.

Increasingly, the same tactics used in Afghanistan will be replicated in Pakistan and beyond. It is very likely that Pakistan will continue to suffer from attacks of the scale of the Islamabad Marriot bombing in September 2008. Unless the international community assists Pakistan, the instability in Pakistan will grow in 2009.

There is a mistaken belief among policy and decision-makers in Washington D.C. and London that they must not be seen with the mainstream Muslim leaders with the potential to counter terrorism. The key to winning the fight is to build lasting partnerships between enlightened Western and mainstream Muslim leaders and their institutions to counter extremism. As terrorism is a by-product of extremism, it is paramount to counter the misinterpretation of religious messages to justify acts of violence. Every Islamic and Muslim school can be tapped as a vanguard to build future peace.

While encouraging and supporting the Muslim governmental and non-governmental organizations to proactively and reactively counter extremism, the West will need to be more sensitive to Muslim sensibility. The Danish publication of a caricature of the Prophet, the Dutch release of the controversial *Fitna* movie and the American use of provocative terminologies such as "crusade" and "Islamic terrorism" favored the terrorists and extremists.

Without Muslim public support, the fight against terrorism and extremism will be lost. Furthermore, without building an enduring partnership between the West and the Muslim world, the fight cannot be won. Formal and informal education of the Muslim world, especially of its leaders, will be essential to winning the defining conflict of the early 21st century.

RMS assess that terrorism risk in 2009 continues to be relatively stable because the heightened threat is balanced by robust counter-terrorism activity: as the threat changes, security forces try to respond to contain it. This is particularly the case in countries in North America, Western Europe and Australia. The RMS Standard (2009) Risk Outlook was parameterized taking into account this terrorism landscape. Insurers wanting to review the likely effects of increased or reduced threat should change their risk outlook accordingly.

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OBAMA'S PRESIDENCY

President Obama has promised significant changes in America's counter-terrorism strategy. However, due to the complexities and intricacies involved, any policy implemented will carry ramifications on the 'war on terror'. Here are the incoming major counter terrorism issues that President Obama has to face.

Despite the success of the "surge", Iraq remains in a fragile state. Current security gains, as highlighted by the former Commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, General David Petraeus, are short-lived and "not irreversible". Suicide bombings still occur on regular basis in Iraq and demonstrate the limitations of military achievements. President Obama has outlined a 16-month timetable for troop withdrawal from Iraq. However, Iraqi government and national security forces are still too weak to enforce security in the country and incapable to mend the internal fabric of Iraqi society. A rapid U.S. rollback could potentially lead to a civil war; and its effect could cascade to the whole Middle East and beyond.

The situation in Iran compounds the security quagmire in Iraq. This is due to its capacity to exert her influence in Iraq, and her ability to support terrorist groups in the Middle East. A military confrontation with Iran is likely to increase the chances of a confrontation with Iranian supported militant groups such as Hezbollah. President Obama has said he is willing to reverse Bush's policy by offering direct talks with Iran by offering economic incentives for Tehran to stop its nuclear program, but has also warned that sanctions could be toughened if Iran refuses his offer. However, it remains unclear how Obama's "tough and direct diplomacy" will be able to counter Tehran's overarching strategy.

On the Afghani front, the White House is currently reviewing their approach to stabilize Kabul. One plan is to extract the Pashtun tribes away from the Taliban by exploring the possibility of negotiating with willing parties to bring them into mainstream politics. The incoming Obama administration has shown signs that it will consider adopting this approach. However, a potential problem is that Pakistani militants crossing the border into Afghanistan continue to be a thorn for security forces in Afghanistan. President Obama's pledge to conduct raids on Pakistani soil to curb such incursions will encourage tribal stakeholders to lash out against both governments. To achieve stability in Afghanistan, the U.S., the NATO countries, tribal leaders along with the Afghan government have to work together. However, potential hiccups are already appearing. It is still uncertain whether the Obama administration would support the re-election of Hamid Karzai as President of Afghanistan. Fissures have also appeared among NATO countries about their strategy in Afghanistan.

Since security situations of the two countries are intertwined, Obama has also stressed that a part of the answer for Afghanistan has to be found in Pakistan. Growing anti-American sentiment throughout Pakistan makes this one of the more immediate challenge facing the Obama administration. The attacks in Mumbai have also renewed suspicions that parts of the Pakistani governmental apparatus, particularly its military intelligence agency, the ISI, might not completely support Washington's fight against terrorism. Obama cannot afford to see Pakistan fail, nor can it ignore the extremists operating in Pakistan's tribal border areas.

On the home front, Obama's strategy is geared towards improving intelligence capabilities. He has placed a greater emphasis on intelligence, as well as increasing the capacity to share intelligence across all levels of government. There is also a specific commitment to establish a grant program to support state level intelligence analysts. Such policies will add an extra burden to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS will test Obama's urge to reform and overhaul government against the realities of the federal bureaucracy. Created five years ago by combining 22 federal agencies, Homeland Security remains a fragmented unit. It is unclear whether under the new stewardship of Janet Napolitano, who will replace Michael Chertoff as the head of DHS, will become a cohesive integrated agency. The current economic climate could also limit the resources for DHS. The Obama administration has also promised to invest more effort in winning the hearts and minds battle. They are committed to shutting down the Guantanamo Bay prison facility and ending the CIA's use of "enhanced" interrogation techniques. However, President Obama has responded promptly on this issue it has not been clear on what it will erect to replace these programs implemented during the previous administration.

Having campaigned on a theme of change, President Obama is likely to find that bringing about the improvements in the counter-terrorism arena will be harder in practice than in theory. He will inherit a series of challenges and perceived threats that will require a degree of continuity from the previous administration. Thus, the changes Obama brings to U.S. counter-terrorism policy will be more of a change in style, rather than substance.

MUMBAI ATTACK REVISITED

The attacks in Mumbai that killed 173 people and injured more than 308 were a coordinated simultaneous attack, consistent with the modus operandi of jihadi groups such as Al Qaeda. However, what was unique in this attack was that it did not rely on suicide bombers but on armed attackers instead.

Suicide armed attacks involve an individual or a group opening fire on a gathering of people in order to kill as many as possible. These attacks allow terrorists to maximize damage before security services are able to respond effectively. Their ability to roam around and sustain the attack, while being willing to kill themselves in the onslaught, makes it more difficult to combat and far more drawn out than an instantaneous suicide bomb attack might potentially have been. The deployment of this tactic in Mumbai shows that this technique has now found a new and even more dangerous theatre in which to operate.

The suicide armed attacks in Mumbai were stunning, but not unprecedented. The Luxor Massacre in 1997 and the attack on the housing compound in Khobar, Saudi Arabia in 2004 are two notable examples of such attacks. Al-Qaeda training material, such as the Encyclopedia Jihad series and its internal training videos, provide extensive guidance on such attacks. Several terrorist groups have also incorporated such assaults as part of their attack repertoire. The Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are famous for sending suicide squads against military targets. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the jihadist group believed to be responsible for the attacks in Mumbai, is famous for its trademark fidayeen operations. These involve attacking targets in the form of suicide assaults carried out by dedicated fidayeen squads. Such fidayeen operations perpetuated by the LeT differ from the Mumbai attacks in that they focused on military or political targets rather than the 'soft', civilian targets. Nonetheless, similar tactics may have been used given the perceived benefits.

The Mumbai attacks have probably made such assaults a more attractive tactic for terrorist groups. These type of operations can be as simple as acquiring firearm ammunition and choosing the nearest crowded place to open fire or as complicated as planning a targeted strike against a series of targets. From the terrorist's perspective, fidayeen-style assaults offer a number of advantages. Such attacks allow for greater target discrimination, flexibility during the operation, cause large numbers of casualties and generate worldwide media exposure. Countries where small-arms are relatively more available would ostensibly be more vulnerable than countries where laws are more restrictive. For these reasons, such an attack mode could be a potential tactic of choice for any group looking to launch a high-profile operation.

Be that as it may, the probability of an attack of the magnitude of Mumbai in a developed country such as the U.S. or in Western Europe still remains relatively low. The difficulties in sourcing enough weapons and ammunition for multiple attackers in most developed countries mitigates against jihadists deciding upon a firearms assault rather than a suicide bombing. Moreover, the risks of intelligence interception and the greater logistical burden of transport also makes it more difficult for terrorist groups to undertake such a mission before being detected by the authorities.

RMS assessment is that terrorist groups may participate in such attacks from time-to-time, when the opportunity arises. However, such attacks will typically target people in crowded areas that lay outside any security perimeter checks such as a ticketing area of an airport. Military forces and other government personnel operating in foreign countries face a significant threat from these types of attacks. Most probable targets for such attacks are landmark buildings where there is a large civilian presence. While terrorist groups such as the LeT will continue to use firearms assaults, the difficulty, expense and low probability of major success suggests suicide bombings will continue to remain the tactic of choice for jihadists.

IS THIS THE END FOR THE FARC?

After suffering a series of blows at the hands of the Colombian Armed forces over the past couple of months, the paramilitary group, Front of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), appears to be reeling. However, the FARC forces have not completely been defeated and it still poses a serious threat in the Latin American region.

The FARC is the largest and best-equipped paramilitary group in Colombia. Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, it operates in the jungles of the south and east of the country. The FARC have employed vehicle bombings, assassinations, kidnapping, and hijacking against civilian and government targets that they consider a threat to its movement. However, since 2002, the rebels have found themselves increasingly on the defensive. Colombian military offensive has driven the FARC out of many regions and slashed their fighting force significantly; this has culminated with "Operation Checkmate," in July 2008 where Colombian security forces were able to rescue 15 hostages—including high-profile captive Ingrid Betancourt, three American citizens, and 11 soldiers and police from the FARC.

Intelligence gathered from Colombian security forces indicate that the FARC's operational capability has been severely dented. Gone are the days when the FARC could easily mount operations from its rural heartland and take control of towns for several days before the authorities could react. The FARC has lost support among average Colombians, even with its traditional bastions of peasants and no longer controls any significant towns. In the past few years, the total strength of the FARC has more than halved from approximately 18,000 fighters to around 7,000 combatants, according to government estimates. Moreover, the death of FARC's founder Manuel Marulanda and the killing of chief ideologue Raul Reyes have left the organization partially decapitated. The FARC has also experienced problems obtaining military-grade weapons that would enable it to undertake large-scale and spectacular terrorist attacks.

It is also clear that the Colombian security forces have shown stronger operational capabilities. After receiving several billion dollars worth military aid from the U.S., the Colombian military is now equipped with a range of advanced technological tools, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This, combined with more reliable intelligence from human sources, principally demobilized and captured FARC insurgents, has given the Colombian security forces the operational edge to overcome FARC forces.

Even with the series of setbacks the FARC is far from defeated. With more than 7,000 combatants, the FARC still remains a potent force. For example, a month after Operation Checkmate the FARC were able to orchestrate an attack at a festival in Ituango, Colombia, killing 7 people and injuring more than 50 others. The FARC still also has access to Colombia's thriving illegal drugs business. Involvement in drugs cultivation and trafficking is by far the FARC's most important source of revenue. Unfortunately, the Uribe government has made no progress in reducing the volume of cocaine smuggled out of Colombia. According to the United Nations, the area under cultivation for coca crops at the end of 2007 stood at 99,000 hectares, up 27 percent from a year earlier and unchanged from 2002.

Recently, FARC guerrillas have also developed an extensive political network to supplement their criminal and terrorist activity, with important nodes including the political leadership of Ecuador and Venezuela. Texts of letters found in a computer belonged to FARC leader Raul Reyes have been published and it is believed to have included letters describing diplomatic initiatives from FARC's leaders to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.

Despite evidence suggesting the FARC has become a seriously diminished force, there is still no sign that the FARC is willing to lay down their arms and enter peace negotiations. In the short and medium term, while there has been a structural weakening of the FARC, we should still expect terrorist attacks in Bogotá and in other major cities in Colombia as they seek to demonstrate its remaining strength. Columbia is in the highest category of terrorism risk in RMS' Global Terrorism Risk Model and is ranked third in the world by average annual casualty rate.

RENEWED THREAT OF LEFTIST POLITICAL VIOLENCE

With the severe global economic downturn comes the renewal of the threat of anti-globalization leftist political violence, which may increase the level of microterror insurance loss worldwide.

Ever since Michèle Alliot-Marie took office last May, the French Interior Minister has been warning that Europe faces a threat from a new generation of ultra-leftist terrorists, who aspire to emulate the 1970's activities of the French terrorist group Action Directe, the Italian Red Brigades and the German Baader-Meinhof gang. The recent powerful movie entitled: 'The Baader-Meinhof Complex', captures the 'terror-chic' of the 1970's, which has parallels with the 'Jihadi-cool' of this decade, and underlines the importance of the hearts-and-minds campaign in combating the root causes of political violence. There is a moment in the movie, when a police chief comments that '25% of Germans under thirty sympathize with the Red Army Faction. Four million people are a lot to keep under watch.' Sympathy for leftist groups may be bolstered in the coming months of economic recession by mass unemployment and financial hardship.

Left-wing groups generally profess a revolutionary socialist doctrine and view themselves as protectors of the people against the tyranny of capitalism and imperialism. They aim to bring about change through revolution rather than through the established political process. From the 1960's to the 1980's, the Cold War, coupled with anti-colonialist movements fueled leftist extremism movements. National independence movements in formerly colonized countries often fused nationalist and socialist impulses. Many turned to terrorist tactics to reach their political objectives. Palestinian groups who turned to international terrorism to bring attention to their cause were one such example,

In the 1980's, however the fortunes of the leftist movement changed as law enforcement dismantled the infrastructure of many of these groups and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe deprived the movement of its ideological foundation and patronage. Even without state support, the threat from left-wing extremists did not completely collapse. Residual activity consisting of a motley array of anarchists and extremist socialist groups still remain and continue to be active particularly in Western Europe. In October and November 2008, some pieces of metal were suspended on the 25,000 volts power supply of high-speed rail lines in France, bringing down wires when a train passed. This caused enormous aggravation for thousands of passengers whose trains were stuck for hours. From a terrorist's perspective, an attack on the national railway is a symbolic attack on the state itself. Then, on December 16th, a bomb consisting of five sticks of dynamite was found in a restroom of the Printemps department store in Paris, the epitome of a capitalist store target, and famous for its unique floor of fashionable ladies shoes, with an inventory value of millions of dollars. According to French intelligence sources, the evidence points leftwards. "The ultra-left is a threat which should be taken seriously. There is a real resurgence of these movements, driven by groups in Germany, Britain and the United States."

Such a threat may spread rapidly like a contagion. Greek anti-terror police are investigating an armed attack against riot police in Athens on January 5th that has raised fears of a resurgence of domestic terrorism. Authorities said the attack may be linked to an extreme left-wing group that fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the U.S. embassy in Athens two years ago. Responsibility for the attack has been claimed on behalf of a domestic extremist group known as Revolutionary Struggle. The shooting came soon after Greece was paralyzed in December by its worst rioting in decades, triggered by the fatal police shooting of a teenager. As unemployment and debt levels rise, an increase may be anticipated in insurance losses from criminal activity. This may include a rising burden of loss from microterror activity associated with leftist groups.

The RMS U.S. Probabilistic Terrorism Model (PTM) incorporates the full spectrum of domestic threat groups which includes eco-terrorism organizations in its micro-terrorism model. Domestic threat groups are geographically and ideologically distinct and are modeled independently. The threat groups are distinguished geographically on a state-by-state basis and ideologically by assessing the tendency of a particular threat group to go after distinct classes of targets, or risk classes.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Commercial property-casualty insurers still remain unwilling to provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) coverage under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act due to uncertainties about the risk and the degree of catastrophic loss, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said, December 12, 2008. In a report released, the GAO said that insurers rely on exclusions for such attack modes, *"although such exclusions may be subject to challenges in court because they were not specifically drafted to address terrorist attacks."* Companies that own high-value properties in large cities are among those policyholders who are unable to obtain CBRN coverage, the survey found. At the same time, workers' compensation, group life and health insurers generally provide such coverage because states do not allow them to exclude those risks, the report said.

Belgian authorities have arrested 14 suspected Al Qaeda terrorists including an individual who was allegedly planning a suicide attack, December 11, 2008. Sixteen raids were executed by 242 police officers in Brussels and in the eastern city of Liege. Security and judicial sources described the arrests as the *"most important anti-terrorism operation in Belgium."* Citing the Federal prosecutor's office, AFP reported that the move was targeting *"a Belgian Islamist group involved in training as well as fighting on the Pakistan-Afghan border in cooperation with important figures in Al Qaeda."*

The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, chaired by former U.S. Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent warns in a recent report that a major CBRN attacks in the United States or overseas within the next five years, December 3, 2008. Members of the Commission said the risk of such attacks is growing because Al Qaeda and other terrorists have shown continued strong interest in using such weapons of mass destruction and could potentially try to hire rogue scientists to achieve this aim. The commission also concluded that the terrorists are more likely to use biological weapons such as anthrax rather than nuclear weapons.

Insurance companies that have insured the terrorist-attacked hotels in Mumbai will not be affected by property damage claims as the loss will be met from a terrorism risk pool, managed by the state-run General Insurance Corp of India (GIC), November 26, 2008. However, insurance companies in India are wary that the insurance pool covering terrorist attacks will be wiped out. The claims for property damage as well as loss of profit will be met from the Rs.7.5-billion (US \$153 million) terrorism risk pool. The nine-year-old terrorism pool, with 12 public and private sector insurance companies contributing, provide terrorism insurance cover in standard fire insurance policy and the premium collected by them is pooled. These companies withdraw amounts in the case of claims against terror attacks. The global terrorism insurance market is constantly molded by regulatory developments. In response to such government regulations, RMS is working on releasing Industry Loss Curves (ILC) to provide estimates of pool losses for countries that have terrorism insurance pools.

FORTHCOMING RMS EVENTS

RMS Client Conference

May 5 - 8, 2009 Colorado Springs, Colorado

Please mark you calendars for the 2009 RMS Client Conference. This year our annual conference will be held in Colorado Springs at the Broadmoor.

Advance registration required. Details and registration information will be posted on the RMS website shortly.

RMS Terrorism Seminar

July 23, 2009, Hudson Theater, Millennium Broadway Hotel, New York, New York

RMS will again host its annual terrorism seminar for clients where we provide an opportunity to hear first hand from some of the world's leading terrorism experts on how the threat of terrorism is evolving and the likely impact on the insurance industry. This year our annual conference will be held in Colorado Springs at the Broadmoor.

Advance registration required. Details and registration information will be posted on the RMS website shortly.

RMS TERRORISM PRODUCTS

U.S. Probabilistic Terrorism Model Version 2.7, released in August 2008 incorporates parameterization for terrorism risk in the United States in 2009. Some of the primary features include:

- Updated analysis of terrorism risk from foreign and domestic terrorist organizations
- Conventional and CBRN attack modes
- Multiple Risk Outlooks for the terrorism threat environment in 2009: expected as well as increased and decreased risk perspectives

New documentation *U.S. Terrorism Risk Model: Parameterization for 2009*, is available to clients on request.

RiskLink® and RiskBrowser® Version 8.0, released in August 2008 includes worldwide capability for exposure and accumulation management and modeling terrorism scenarios with geocoding available in over 150 countries, including street-level resolution for Western Europe.

Global Terrorism Risk Model Version 2.7, released in August 2008 includes coverage of 228 countries, incorporating site-specific EP curves and portfolio management capability. Modeling provides terrorism loss rates for insured assets by class, city, and ownership anywhere in the world. Risk assessment is available for both property and human exposures.

Terrorism Risk Management System Version 1.0, released in July 2008 is a visualization tool designed for underwriters and portfolio managers to gain greater insight into their exposure to terrorism risk and make more informed decisions. The Terrorism Risk Management System has been designed to simplify the visualization of quantitative and qualitative data along with contextualized terrorism-specific data layers.

Terrorism & Security Risk Manager is an online information service for insurers and risk managers, linked to the RMS Global Terrorism Risk Model. It is produced in collaboration with Jane's Information Group, the leading independent provider of defense and security information.