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Game Theory and Terrorism Risk
The following article, written for Lloyd's by Dr. Gordon Woo, catastrophe research consultant for RMS, was
first published in July 2002.
'It is a feature of a democracy that a security
service will follow a new security threat than foreseeing it'. This
candid declaration appears in the autobiography of Stella Rimington,
former director-general of the British Intelligence Service MI5. In
1969, the first year of her career at MI5, she admits there was very
little intelligence, and practically no sources of information about the
resurgence of the IRA. In 1996, the last year of her career at MI5,
Afghan waiters in London were openly soliciting American signatories for
flight training in USA. With counter-terrorism intelligence services in
western democracies struggling to identify new security threats, how can
insurers come to terms with terrorism risk?
Insurers are accustomed to covering earthquake risks,
even if some seismic threats remain to be identified.
Just as with natural perils, the objectives of civic
authorities and insurers differ in respect of risk assessment. Being
responsible primarily for public safety, civic authorities endeavour to
warn against specific imminent hazard events. Insurers, on the other
hand, seek to quantify the risk not over days, but over a number of
months. Suppose that the time and location of a major al-Qaeda attack
were decided randomly, such as by the throw of dice. This knowledge
would be very instructive for insurers, even though the lack of
predictive power on timing would frustrate the deployment of security
forces. In fact, it is known that there is a significant random, partly
serendipitous, element in an al-Qaeda attack; not without some reason
can the outcome be declared an act of God.
From the mathematical perspective of game theory,
popularized in the Oscar-winning movie ‘A Beautiful Mind’, the
incorporation of a purely chance component into operational
decision-making is a virtue: randomizing the choice between alternative
strategies helps throw your opponent off balance. If Osama bin Laden
tossed a coin in a cave to decide on which of two cities to target, no
amount of satellite intelligence would clarify the choice. The larger
the random component the bigger the task for the over-stretched security
forces. However, for insurers with well-diversified books of terrorism
business, this aleatory component in terrorism risk would lend support
to the optimistic view that, with a sufficient measure of skill and
expertise, this is a class of risk that can be successfully
underwritten.
Given the importance of geographical diversification,
it is essential for underwriters to track excessive concentrations of
urban exposure. Databases of potential commercial, industrial, military,
government and diplomatic targets are being assembled allowing
underwriters to map their terrorism exposures using geographical
information systems.
Even with well separated urban exposures, the
prospect of synchronized al-Qaeda attacks across a continent encourages
prudence in PML assignments. The launching of synchronized attacks is an
al-Qaeda hallmark; one designed to maximize the impact of new modes of
terrorism. Recognizing that the level of defence against a new attack
mode would inevitably rise after the first such attack, the maximum blow
would be struck by aiming for a number of targets at about the same
time.
Sensitivity to target hardness is reflected more
broadly in the choice of specific al-Qaeda targets. Diligence and
patience in target selection greatly improves the likelihood of mission
success. With equal purposefulness, the virtues of diligence and
patience might usefully be exercised by underwriters in selecting the
more secure targets. Security is to terrorism what vulnerability is to
earthquakes. If two parts of a building are constructed to different
seismic standards, the lower standard construction is more likely to be
damaged in an earthquake. Similarly, if two gates to a building have
different levels of security protection, the gate with lower security is
more likely to be infiltrated by terrorists.
'It is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force
as possible to attack the enemies of God.' Through stark statements such
as this, Osama bin Laden gave public notice that, once al-Qaeda had
access to weapons of mass destruction, it would not hesitate to use
them. With any complex weapon system, there is a cost/effectiveness
curve to climb before any attack in earnest can be made with a realistic
prospect of success.
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